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Abstract
Federalist thought has historically been an important source of inspiration in
European integration. Although the last few decades have witnessed a gradual
decline of the concept’s relevance, the most recent developments in the wake
of the Eurozone debt crisis have drawn renewed attention to shortcomings
in the European Union’s institutional architecture as well as to the feasibility
of federal solutions to such institutional shortcomings. This article explores
the potential of federalist thought as a blueprint for institutional reform in
the EU. Based on a brief introduction to the concept of federalism, the
article contextualizes federalism in debates on the democratic deficit, the
EU’s sources of legitimacy and the relationship between the union institutions
and the member states. If shortcomings in institutional design are the source
of the current (and future) crises, then closer attention needs to be paid to
the  costs  and  benefits  of  federal  reorganization  in  terms  of  democracy,
legitimacy and sovereignty, particularly from the perspective of small states
in the EU. Federal reorganization would not only improve the democratic
character of EU decision making, but also strengthen the role of small states
in the union. However, it also prompts a number of thorny questions, most
importantly regarding the construction of a European demos and its relation -
ship to deeply engrained ideas about the nation state as a more or less natural
home of democracy.
Keywords: European Union, federalism, institutional reform, democratic
deficit, postnational democracy, constitutional patriotism.
Federalism: Still Relevant in European Integration?
Federalist  thought  has  historically  been  an  important  source  of  inspiration  for
European  integration,  both  as  a  vision  and  as  a  concrete  process  of  institution
building. Many of the key thinkers advocating European unification in the interwar
period as well as during and after World War II were declared federalists, the most
prominent examples of whom include figures such as Coudenhove-Kalergi or Spinelli
and Rossi. Even the Monnet method of incremental integration, to be distinguished
from  the  revolutionary  federalism  of  the  Ventotene  Manifesto,  is  based  on  a  clear
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Maximilian Conrad, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Freyja Steingrímsdóttir, B.A.normative preference for a gradual federalization of Europe. But also more recent
proponents of European federalism such as Joschka Fischer and Guy Verhofstadt are
testimony to the lasting legacy of federalism in thought about the European integration
process, as is Spinelli’s work in the European Parliament for much of the rest of his
life.
Recent decades have however witnessed a gradual decline of the relevance of
federalist ideas as a driving force for leading European politicians. While Fischer and
Verhofstadt  are  still  quite  frequent  in  their  pleas  for  a  strengthening  of  the
supranational European institutions and a decisive move in the federal direction, it
has correctly been pointed out that most leading politicians nowadays tend to shy
away from using what has increasingly come to be perceived as the F-word in European
integration,  even  when  promoting  a  significant  strengthening  of  the  European
institutions.  Nonetheless,  the  Eurozone  debt  crisis  and  the  institutional  reform
responses which it has prompted – not least from federalists – urge a reconsideration
of the costs and benefits of federal reorganization in terms of the sovereignty of the
nation state, the alleged democratic deficit in the European Union, and the strategies
for legitimation available to the EU. The purpose of this article is to explore these
issues  in  order  to  provide  a  conceptual  basis  for  further  discussion  on  federal
reorganization in the EU, specifically in the context of Icelandic public debate on the
EU and Iceland’s role as a potential future member state. What would or could a
European Union organized according to federal principles look like, and what would
the role and power potential of small states be in a polity of this kind? There is
certainly an element of speculation in asking this question, as there is evidently not
one single way of organizing a federal polity. Nonetheless, federalist theory not only
continues to be of particular relevance to organizations building central institutions
on the basis of already existing constituent units, but also gives us enough theoretical
guidance to stake out a variety of institutional options for a federal European polity.
Based on a brief conceptual introduction to federalism, we contextualize federalism
in debates on the future of the EU as a polity and on the sources of the union’s
legitimacy. We then proceed to an illustration of the legacy of federalist thought in
the history of European integration, before we address concrete institutional reforms
along federal lines that have been debated in recent years. Most importantly, we also
address the question of the role of small states in an EU reorganized along federal
lines.
1. Sources of Legitimacy in European Integration
Legitimation continues to be a contested issue in European integration. A democratic
deficit in the EU has come to be regarded as a fact, although it is by no means self-
evident  what  constitutes  this  democratic  deficit,  on  what  conceptual  basis  such
assessments are made, and arguably least of all what institutional solutions are avail  -
able (Conrad 2010). While most scholars acknowledge the existence of some form of
democratic  deficit,  Giandomenico  Majone  and  Andrew  Moravcsik  contest  this
conventional wisdom. Moravscik goes so far as to argue that democratic legitimacy is
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the assertion that the European integration process is situated squarely within the
realm of international relations: as an intergovernmental organization, the EU should
not be subjected to the same expectations on democratic performance as a con  -
stitutional state. In addition, the most important legislative institutions – the Council
of  Ministers  and  the  European  Parliament  –  are  directly  elected  and/or  directly
accountable to electorates within the member states (Moravcsik 2008). Majone takes a
similar stance, maintaining that the EU’s legitimacy rests on the legitimacy of national,
democratically  accountable  governments,  since  the  entire  process  is  guided  and
controlled by sovereign member states (Majone 1998: 12). 
Yet the European Union is clearly more than an intergovernmental organization
(Eriksen & Fossum 2004, 2007). There is some truth to the conventional wisdom that
the European Union is “polity sui generis”, which is underlined by the complex mix
of supranational and intergovernmental elements in the EU’s institutional architecture.
This leads to the question as to how much (and indeed what kind of) democracy is
necessary and possible at the European level, but also what sources of legitimacy the
integration process can draw on. From a federalist perspective, one evident root cause
of the democratic deficit is institutional design. Most of the democratic shortcomings
that are usually emphasized by Euroskeptics could be fixed in a process of federal
reorganization.  Such  issues prominently include  the lack  of accountability of the
European Commission, the (still) quite limited role of the European Parliament, the
independent role of the European Court of Justice, and so on. Such deficits (which
are discussed further in section 3) are reflections of a concept of democracy that
reflects the Westphalian state system and is therefore difficult to apply to the context
of European integration (Eriksen & Fossum 2012). In a sense, given this grounding
in a Westphalian understanding of democracy as inherently bound to the context of
the nation state, the alleged democratic deficit is a genuine conundrum: if democracy
can only be achieved within the nation state, then the EU would either have to become
(much more like) a state, or it would need to significantly scale down the scope of its
integration activities.
The upshot of debates on the democratic deficit is less that there is something
wrong with the EU’s institutional architecture, but instead that there is something
wrong with democratic theory, as the latter does not allow us to “think outside the
box”  and  imagine  democratic  procedures  beyond  the  nation  state  (cf.  Eriksen  &
Fossum  2012).  To  begin  with,  the  two  dominant  ideas  regarding  the  sources  of
legitimacy that the European integration process has to draw on are both essentially
state-based: the EU can remain at the level of an intergovernmental problem-solving
organization along Moravcsik’s lines; or it can develop into a European federation
based on a community of cultural values. In the former scenario, its problem-solving
capacity would serve as its exclusive (and sufficient) source of legitimacy (Eriksen &
Fossum  2004).  Unless  the  organization  can  demonstrate  that  it  can  solve  given
problems  better  or  more  effectively  than  the  nation  state,  it  would  have  to  be
considered illegitimate. This would also imply that there is no need for democratic
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suffice in a model of democracy that could be described as “audit democracy” (Lord
2012; Eriksen & Fossum 2012: 22f.).
The latter scenario reminds us that legitimacy is not necessarily democratic legitimacy.
European integration can be said to suffer from a number of community deficits that can
be viewed as the root cause of the democratic deficit. Kielmansegg observed already
in 1996 that Europeans do not share a politically relevant collective identity because
Europe “is no community of communication, barely a community of memory and
only to a very limited extent a community of experience” (Kielmansegg 1996, quoted
in Conrad 2009: 42). Etzioni similarly argues that the democratic deficit is perceived
as such foremost because European integration has proceeded into policy areas in
which communitarization would require a significantly stronger sense of “normative-
affective community”, i.e. a sense of European community that arises from shared
moral values (Etzioni 2007). In this sense, concerns about a lack of democracy can
better be described as a byproduct of the perception that integration has gone too far.
Etzioni’s  notion  of  the  community  deficit  further  explains  efforts  made  to
overcome the community deficit by emphasizing cultural similarities between the EU
member states – not so much because it would enhance the democratic legitimacy of
the European integration process, but much more because it would provide for a
sense  of  cultural  community  of  values  that  could  in  turn  serve  as  a  source  of
legitimacy. This communitarian strategy is often portrayed as connected to the idea of
federalism, arguably because it draws on the idea that federations are characterized by
“unity in diversity”, i.e. by a balance that needs to be struck between creating strong
central institutions while maintaining as much of the autonomy (and indeed identity)
of the constituent units as possible (see section 2). Nevertheless, even federations – in
this communitarian understanding – require a sense of collective identity to start out
with. 
Yet this is not the kind of federalism we are talking about in the context of this
article. Our argument is that the link between federalism and communitarian legitimacy
is  exaggerated.  As  a  consequence,  our  interest  is  in  the  contribution  that  federal
reorganization can make towards the specific goal of democratic legitimacy. Federalism
can provide institutional means to generate democratic legitimacy, even (and specifically)
in the absence of a thick sense of collective identity. Democratic theory has so far
merely begun to theorize the conditions for democracy outside the context of the
nation  state.  Habermas  pointed  out  already  in  his  essay  on  the  “postnational
constellation” that inasmuch as decisions are increasingly made in forums outside the
nation state, there is a clear need for a reconstitution of democracy, preferably at the
European level (Habermas 1998). Recently, Eriksen & Fossum (2012) have emphasized
that the debate on the future of democracy in the EU is quite problematic, as the first
two models identified so far – audit democracy in what is essentially a problem-
solving organization, or federal democracy in what is essentially a culturally integrated
regional European state – fail to take us any further as regards the question on the
link between the (nation) state and democracy: both are founded on the same state-
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transformationalist democratic theory in the tradition of Habermas and Held, which
Bohman  considers  to  be  much  less transformationalist  than  necessary:  merely
reconstituting democracy at the European level (through European demos construction)
not only produces more of the same kind of democracy, but creates a problematic
relationship between the newly created European demos and the already existing and
democratically constituted member state demoi (in the plural) (Bohman 2007).
In this article, we are therefore exploring the contribution that federalism has to
make in terms of democratic legitimacy in a European polity that would not be based
on a reconstitution of Europe, but rather on a reconfiguration of democracy along
the path staked out by Eriksen and Fossum (2012): federalism has a contribution to
make precisely because the European Union would have to become a novel kind of
rights-based, postnational polity. Against this backdrop, it is wrong to assume that the
question of EU democracy requires a reconstitution of  Europe to fit existing state-based
models of democracy (i.e. models 1 or 2 discussed above). Instead, the future of
democracy in the EU urges democratic theory to engage in a more fundamental
reconfiguration of  democracy, specifically to develop a democratic theory that disconnects
the institutional form of democracy from the nation-state context within which it has
emerged.  If  anything,  European  integration  challenges  the  taken-for-granted
understanding that democracy is only possible within the nation state. Federalism, at
least as long as it is framed in terms of the EU conceived as a rights-based, post  -
national polity can develop a decentered understanding of democracy that is not
founded on the notion of the popular sovereignty of a single unified demos, but rather
on a non-hierarchical coexistence of a multitude of national (and indeed subnational)
demoi  and one  overarching  European  demos.  The  Habermasian  notion  of
constitutional patriotism is certainly relevant in this context inasmuch as it provides a
basis for imaging the sort of “identity light” (Risse 2004) that would be necessary to
sustain  such  a  coexistence  of  already  democratically  constituted  national  demoi
(Conrad 2009). As a mode of attachment, a European constitutional patriotism would
be based on political identification with moral, political and legal principles as well as
liberal democratic procedures which are entrenched in a common constitution (Mueller
2008: 545; Thomassen 2010: 144f.). Europe is far too diverse and fragmented for
integration to be based on one common cultural community and the shared values that
would constitute it (Thomassen 2010: 41). Social integration would be sufficient at the
political level (ibid.: 145), clearly resonating very well with the kind of federalism
proposed here, following the rights-based idea of a postnational polity.
STJÓRNMÁL
&
STJÓRNSÝSLA
249 F-Word or Blueprint for Institutional Reform?
Maximilian Conrad & Freyja Steingrímsdóttir2. European Integration and the Legacy of Federalism
2.1 Unity in Diversity: Conceptual Foundations of Federalism
Both in debates about the future of European integration or on institutional reform
in the EU, federalism is frequently mistaken to imply excessive centralization, i.e.
more or less the exact opposite of the form of decentralized democracy that the
concept actually suggests, both in terms of its etymological origin and in terms of its
institutional reality (Stepan 2004b: 57-59; MacAskill 2001). This suggests that the
concept itself bears more power to frame debates than its institutional implications,
but it also motivates a closer look at the etymological origin of federalism. The latter
is far more than a trivial language lesson, as it contributes both to a fundamental
understanding of federalist theory and to an appreciation of the opportunities as well
as challenges of a federal reorganization of Europe. The word ‘federalism’ derives
from the Latin root foedus, meaning agreement, bargain or contract; but it also derives
from fides, meaning faith or trust (Burgess 2000: 13; King 1982: 56). This contractual
connotation is captured in Livingston’s definition of federalism in terms of power
sharing between central and regional units that are endowed with certain functions
and powers that one cannot be deprived of  by the other (Livingston 1952: 81; italics added).
Similarly, Elazar described federalism as the combination of shared rule and of self-
rule  where  two  or  more  polities  find  it  requisite  and  desirable  to  live  within  a
constitutional framework that will allow them to hold on to their diversity whilst
securing stability and peace through power sharing where necessary (Elazar 1991).
The etymological root of the concept implies both trust and contract the funda  -
mental principle of “unity in diversity”: federations create a contractual relationship
that ties them together in common institutions, but that nonetheless allows them to
retain as much of their individual autonomy as possible. It is therefore unsurprising
that the focus of most federalist theories is on securing diversity, preserving a plurality
of identities while at the same time making a commitment to power sharing in a
stable political union (Hueglin 2003: 282). 
2.2 Identity, Federalism and Federation
In this sense, we can already identify a certain conceptual problem when federalism is
dismissed for lack  of a preexisting sense of collective identity. More importantly,
however,  it  is  problematic  to  confine  federalism  to  a  communitarian  strategy  for
legitimating European integration: a collective identity may emerge as a byproduct of
the process of political integration, but it certainly cannot be the starting point of the
integration process. This question requires us to take a closer look at the relationship
between federalism and questions of collective identity.
In this context, it is highly relevant to point out that federalism is not merely a
form of organizing power at different levels of government. In our analysis, what is
more important is the fact that federalism tends to be a plausible alternative most of
all in settings characterized by (deep) diversity, i.e. settings that cannot derive legitimacy
from a strong sense of collective identity. This distinction is also captured in the
distinction between federalism and federation, i.e. between federalism as a normative
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1982: 76-79). : 
Federalism has become an important part of the theoretical discourse on the
organization and structure of the state as well as interstate relations (Burgess 2000:
23). Consequently, many nowadays see some form of federalism as the best institut  -
ional answer to the cosmopolitan, interchangeable reality of the modern world, and it
is therefore unsurprising that it is particularly popular in . societies marked by deep-
rooted lingual, cultural and ethnic diversity (Watts 1998: 118; Stepan 1999: 19). The
high-scorers on the index of linguistic and ethnic diversity – Canada, Belgium, Spain,
Switzerland, India and the U.S. – are all federal political systems (Stepan 1999: 20).
The Belgian case can also be used as a case in point underlining the relevance of
federalism in the absence of a strong sense of collective identity. But it should also be
emphasized that the strength (or lack thereof) of a “federal” identity is less important
in the choice for federalism than the strength of the identities of the constituent
units. Some federations – such as the US or Germany – have quite strong senses of
national identity, but it is the salience of “national” identities at the substate level that
explain the relevance of federal organization.
2.3 The Legacy of Federalism
Against this conceptual backdrop, the perception of the concept of federalism as a
taboo in debates on European integration is bewildering, not only because the EU
already today has quite a few federal features. Most of all, it is puzzling considering
the potential contribution that federalism can make, not just in broader terms of
democracy  and  legitimacy,  but  specifically  in  relation  to  postnational  democracy
founded on constitutional patriotism. In this context, federalism hardly appears as a
very threatening concept, at least as long as its meaning, roots and practical implications
are correctly understood and appraised. 
Without these considerations, it would be difficult to fathom why federalism has
played as profound a role as it has in shaping the ideas of the founding fathers of the
integration process. The legacy of federalism in the European context begins long
before  the  integration  process  itself.  Already  in  the  interwar  period,  Richard
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s “Pan-Europa” was published as a plea for a unification of
Europe (Gehler 2006). Like many others at the time, Coudenhouve-Kalergi regarded
the creation of a Pan-European Union as the best way to protect Europe from war,
rising communism and fascism. For Coudenhove-Kalergi, this Pan-European Union
would also serve as a necessary economic counterweight against the emerging world
power, the United States (ibid.). 
Federalism was similarly prominent among resistance movements during World
War II (Bache et al. 2011: 6). The European Union of Federalists (EUF) emerged out
of these movements in 1946, led by Altiero Spinelli (ibid.). In the Ventotene Manifesto,
Spinelli and Rossi were motivated by the vision of a new kind of Europe composed
of individual units that relinquished part of  their autonomy to collective democratic
institutions (Nelsen & Stubb 2003: 91). Spinelli and Rossi viewed the existence of
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the point to be made about federalism is valid: a federal arrangement makes sense
precisely because of the absence of a strong sense of European identity. 
Also Monnet and Schuman, the two founding fathers whose names are intimately
linked  with  neofunctionalist  theorizing  about  the  integration  process,  had  a  clear
federal goal in mind. Their approach was however not “revolutionary federalism” as
in the Ventotene Manifesto. Nonetheless, their incremental approach to integration
had  the  intention  of  developing  an  integrative  momentum  that  would  lead  to  a
gradual federalization of Europe. The Monnet method of incremental integration is
clearly motivated by an awareness of the strength of national identities in Europe.
Against this backdrop, it is unsurprising that Monnet spoke of a “chain reaction, a
ferment where one change induces another (Nelsen & Stubb 2003: 19). 
In his famous speech at Humboldt University in Berlin in May 2000, Joschka
Fischer  –  at  the  time  Germany’s  foreign  minister  in  the  “red-green”  coalition
government of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder – is similarly aware of the strength of
national identities and therefore proposes a federation of nation states as the “completion
of European integration” (Fischer 2000). Some observers criticized this ambition as
an attempt at “squaring the ciricle”, as any federalization would necessarily have to
come at the expense of the nation  state (cf.  Conrad  2009: 143).  Fischer’s vision
entailed a decentralized federal model, in tune with classical federalism, a union with
wider powers, greater democratic accountability as well as a more straightforward
system of decision making. 
In the wake of the ensuing “finality debate”, Guy Verhofstadt – at that time Prime
Minister  of  Belgium  –  supported  Fischer’s  ideas,  calling  for  a  deeply  integrated,
federal EU with an elected president as well as bicameral legislature on par with the
parliamentary systems of fully-fledged nation-states. His focus was on deeper and
quicker integration in many competences as well as speedier enlargement (Collignon
2006). Notable in this context is also the publication of his book “The United States
of Europe” in the aftermath of the French and Dutch referenda on the Constitutional
Treaty in 2005. Here, Verhofstadt advances the vision of a federal Europe of all
existing EU member states. Aware as he was of the reluctance of at least certain
member states to go further into this direction, he also advocated the idea of a
political “core”, a number of “pioneers” that would be able to integrate more fully
without  being  held  back  by  the  skepticism  of  the  member  states  which  didn’t
(Verhofstadt 2006).
In sum, we can therefore look at proposals for a federalization of Europe in part
as a means to achieve an end, namely to provide solutions to existing and emerging
political problems. But more importantly, federal solutions – whether in the form of
the  Ventotene  Manifesto,  Schuman  &  Monnet’s  ferment  of  change  or  Fischer’s
federation of nation states - tend to take into account the lack of a strong sense of
European  identity  as  well  as  the  resilience  of  national  identities.  This  is  further
reflected in the most current responses to the Eurozone debt crisis. In the latter
context, a strengthening of the supranational institutions is urged, yet without any
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and national identities.
3. The Costs and Benefits of Federal Reorganization
If federalism can point us in the direction of institutional solutions to the EU’s
current problems despite the absence of a stronger sense of European identity, we
need to ask what the costs and benefits of a potential federal reorganization of
Europe are from the perspectives of democracy, legitimacy and sovereignty. From a
supranational perspective, the democratic benefits of federal reorganization are fairly
self-evident, at least as compared to the status quo of the EU as a polity sui generis,
which is after all part of the problem of the perception of the democratic deficit (see
section 1). Democracy can be defined as rule of the people, deriving as it does from
the ancient Greek dēmos, which means people, and kratos, which means rule. This simple
etymological point raises relevant questions for democratic theory, specifically whether
democracy beyond the nation state should be the rule of a newly created people/demos
beyond the nation state, or whether the concept of democracy should be dissociated from
the notion of popular sovereignty and become rule of peoples in the plural (Bohman 2007).
From our perspective, federalism can be both, as our conceptual introduction made clear:
rights-based, postnational federalism involves both European demos construction and the
institutionalization of non-domination.
Federal structures offer democratic communities a way of staying intact whilst
preserving a measure of self-rule (Smith 2004: 26). Chryssochoou identified a federal
model of democracy and described it as resting on the formation of a unity of people
(i.e.  a  unified  demos)  rather  than  merely  a  union  of  states.  This  model  seeks  to
reconcile the conditions of greater political union with the claims of the constituent
states. In doing so it aspires to set up a co-operative democratic ethos in interaction
between the center and its subunits (Bache et al. 2011: 74). The normative implications
of federalism require federations to build their legitimate foundation on a contract of
trust between all subunits (King 1982: 88). All citizens of the member states are
simultaneously rendered directly subject to the authority of the center through equal
citizenship  (ibid.:  89).  These  citizens  are  incorporated  into  the  national  decision-
making structure – the citizens of every region enjoy a degree of direct control over
the central government, and the government has some direct responsibility towards
the people as a whole (ibid.). Consequently, also equality is a core principle of federal  -
ism, manifesting itself in the fact that each constituent unit is assigned the same set of
government  responsibilities  under  the  federal  constitution.  The  constitution  then
assigns  all  citizens  the  same  rights  and  responsibilities. Federalism  can  encourage
democratic diversity by creating a system of harmonized but autonomous spheres of
influence, based on a division of authority among state and federal agents, component
legislatures could hold their executives accountable to their particular publics whilst a
European legislature could operate as a possible barrier against the perils of central
executive dominance (Smith 2004: 28-31).
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Considering the contested nature of the EU as a polity (or as an ‘unidentified political
object’),  democratic  theorists  have  been  perplexed  with  regard  to  examining  the
democratic qualities of the EU and comparing them to the ideals of state-centered
democratic  theory.  Among  the  most  commonly  enumerated  features  of  the  EU
democratic deficit are deficiencies in representativeness and accountability and the
lack of a European demos (Warleigh 2003; Bache et al. 2011: 69; Abromeit 1998: 4).
Elsewhere, these deficiencies have been described as an institutional/parliamentary
deficit, a constitutional deficit and a European demos deficit (Chryssochoou 2000: 4).
The institutional/parliamentary deficit is commonly brought up in context with the still
relatively weak European Parliament. The European Parliament isn’t a true legislative
body in the conventional sense (Majone 1998: 6-7), as it has to share its legislative
power with both the Commission and the Council of Ministers. Neither is it a body
for  enforcing  “political  responsibility,”  i.e.  to  hold  government  accountable  to  its
electorate (Abromeit 1998: 4). The core of every representative democracy is its par  -
lia  ment; parliament is the ultimate source of legitimacy in representative democracies.
Consequently, many argue the importance of creating a true parliamentary basis for
EU democracy (ibid.). The EU today is often said to be legitimated (only) indirectly
via the nation states (Moravcsik 2008; cf. Eriksen & Fossum 2004, 2007). At the same
time,  it  can  be  pointed  out  that  national  electorates  are  rarely,  if  ever,  given  the
opportunity  to  express  their  opinions  on  European  issues  in  national  elections
(Abromeit 1998: 5). Of course, the role of the EP has been gradually strengthened
since the first direct elections in 1979, suggesting a gradual correction of the EU
parliamentary  deficit.  However,  voter  turnout  in  EP  elections  remains  low,  and
election campaigns are dominated by domestic rather than European issues (Jensen
2009: 2). The Parliament itself seems not to have managed to make itself relevant to
most Europeans (Gallagher et al. 2006: 128).
In this context, it is worth emphasizing the lack of strong accountability mechan  -
isms. EU citizens are at best in a very limited way able to hold EU decision makers to
account. In addition to the fact that the EU political system and decision-making
processes have by no means become simpler over the years, the European Commission
and the Council of Ministers are at best indirectly legitimated at the national level,
making it impossible for EU citizens to “throw the rascals out” if voters do not like
specific decisions or policies, or the general direction of EU decision making as such.
As a matter of fact, it can even be difficult to identify the re  sponsible “rascals” in the
first place (Gallagher et al. 2006: 128; Jensen 2009:4; Chrysso  choou 2000: 12).
In addition to these deficits of accountability and representativeness, the division
of competences between union and national institutions is hazy (Chryssochoou 2000:
10-12). The idea of executive dominance in the EU suggests tangible tensions already
at  the  national  level,  specifically  between  national  governments  and  national
parliaments, as governments evidently seek to bypass their parliaments in the context
of EU decision making. Governments are represented in the Council of Ministers,
while national parliaments – despite certain changes in the Lisbon Treaty – are for the
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and legitimation (ibid.). EU activities remain under a great deal of influence from
national governmental elites (ibid.). There is thus a need for transformation “from a
system of democratic governments into a democratic system of government (ibid.,
14).” 
The constitutional deficit lies in the fact that Europe doesn’t possess a common
constitution. While the failed constitutional treaty boasted of constitutional symbolism,
a  clearly  codified  European  constitution  outlining  respective  areas  of  union  and
member state competence is still missing. Globalization is continually undermining
the  nation  state’s  problem-solving  capacity  and  by  extension  its  legitimacy,  with
profound  consequences  for  state  sovereignty  (Habermas  1998;  Thomassen  2010:
139). The fact that decisions are increasingly made in forums beyond the nation state
therefore necessitates a transformation and reconstitution of democracy at the same
level. The most suitable solution available for Europe in this regard would arguably be
the reconstitution of democracy at the level of a federal Europe through the making
of a common European constitution (Habermas 1998), in line with the idea of the
EU  as  a  postnational  polity  (Eriksen  &  Fossum  2004,  2007).  This  approach,  as
indicated above, would only be democratically beneficial if it was clearly distinguished
from the idea of a federal European polity based on a culturally defined community
of values (cf. Eriksen & Fossum 2004).
This leaves the thorny question of the demos deficit. In this context, we should
remind ourselves that democracy is of course not only a question of who governs,
but also of who is governed (Chryssochoou 2000: 1). In representative democracies,
democratic legitimacy rests to a significant extent on processes of public opinion and
will  formation.  In  the  language  of  Habermasian  deliberative  democracy,  the
communicative power of the public sphere has to be channeled into the institutions
of the political system, and the latter constantly has to try to win the approval of the
public  sphere  (Habermas  1992).  The  existence  of  a  European  demos  has  been
disputed by many. The same applies to the level of citizen identification with the
European project despite its success in furthering integration. European citizens still
do not view themselves as a collective of members of a single political body (Lacroix
2002:  944).  However,  the  demos  deficit  is  too  often  addressed  from  the  static
perspective of constitutional law, without discussing the notion that identification
with the state – and other citizens of the state – emerges out of democratic practice
itself (Conrad 2009: chap. 1).
3.2 Federal Reorganization: Democracy, Legitimacy, Sovereignty
What impact would a federal reorganization of the Union have in terms of democracy,
legitimacy and sovereignty? From a federalist perspective, there is a clear link between
the  institutional/parliamentary,  constitutional  and  demos  deficits,  with  European
constitution making coming up as a possible remedy to these three deficits. Federal
reorganization  would  necessarily  entail  substantial  institutional  reform.  From  the
point of view of democracy, one main task of this institutional reform project would
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accountability. This lack of democratic accountability is a direct result of the continued
legacy  of  intergovernmentalism  in  the  EU.  All  three  major  legislative  institutions
come to mind in this regard. Only the European Parliament is is directly accountable
to the European citizens already at this point. However, its legislative competences
would need to be extended to match that status. Even if the EP did not become the
sole initiator of the legislative process, the right of legislative initiative would nonetheless
need  to  be  extended  to  the  EP  in  order  for  the  accountability  to  the  European
citizens to actually mean something. 
But if the aim is to achieve stronger accountability of the European institutions,
then the respective roles of the European Commission and the Council of Ministers
also  require  substantial  rethinking  from  a  federalist  perspective.  Regarding  the
Commission, this applies mostly to the role that the EP could play in determining the
Commission President and the composition of the College.. A European Commission
turned  into  an  accountable  European  quasi-government  is  certainly  high  on  the
federalist wishlist. Of course, the evident benefit of democratic accountability would
have to be weighed against the cost of decreased governmental control over the
European  Commission.  Again,  the  lack  of  accountability  of  the  Commission  is
testimony to the intergovernmental legacy in European integration. Increasing its
accountability is therefore democratically plausible, but is highly problematic if member
states are committed to an intergovernmental integration process based on the EU
institutions’ problem-solving capacity and “audit democracy” (Lord 2012; Eriksen &
Fossum 2012).
The current system of choosing Commissioners is a case in point. The process
whereby national governments nominate their respective Commissioners can rightfully
be  criticized  for  being  untransparent.  The  same  applies  to  the  selection  of  the
Commission President by the European Council. The Lisbon Treaty has gone some
way in remedying this by making the choice of Commission President – formally still
in the hands of the European Council – a politicized process in which the European
Council’s choice has to reflect the outcome of the previous EP elections (Art. 17
TEU; Bache et al. 2011: 256f.). But a democratically more plausible approach would
be for the European Parliament not merely to formally elect a candidate pre-determined
by  the  European  Council,  but  rather  to  elect  the  Commission  President  from  a
number  of  candidates  representing  (and  supported  by)  the  EP’s  different  party
groups. This would greatly enhance the accountability of the Commission President
and by extension of the Commission as a whole. However, it would also make the
process  more  supranational  and,  as  a  consequence,  undermine  the  role  of  the
European Council in this regard. In addition, considering the increased democratic
legitimacy of the Commission in this scenario, it might trigger a gradual process of
extending the “governmental” functions of the Commission, similar to the process
of extending the rights of the European Parliament in the years after the first direct
elections in 1979. This would not be a problem from the federalist perspective, but it
would represent a significant step away from the tradition of intergovernmentalism,
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of the integration process.
A development in this direction would also have implications for the role of the
Council of Ministers. Joschka Fischer proposed the role of a second chamber of
parliament for the Council of Ministers, either in the form of a Senate modeled after
US federalism (with senators directly elected at the level of the member states), or “a
chamber of states” along the lines of German federalism. The remarkable aspect is
obviously  that  both  these  federal  solutions  –  albeit  to  different  degrees  –  would
strengthen the role of the smaller and smallest of the union’s member states, from a
system of digressive proportionality (see section 4 below) to a system that either does not
take member state size into account at all (in the Senate scenario), or only to a margin  -
al extent (as in the “Bundesrat” scenario). It is well known that this over  representation
of smaller units is a standard feature of federal systems, facilitating the accommodation
of difference and sub-national demands (Bermeo 2004: 468). Disproportionality at
the parliamentary level is a way of providing checks and balances for minorities as
well as protection for smaller units in a larger entity (ibid., 470). If a polity is large,
multinational and linguistically diverse, like the EU today, its chances of being demo  -
cratic thus improve significantly with the adoption of a federal political system (ibid.,
468). Again, the absence of a strong European identity is an argument for, not against
federalism. Consequently, even if no European demos exists at this moment, at least
not at the desirable level, it might be brought into being as a political identity by the
experience of a common constitution and government, as was the case in a number
of countries, such as Switzerland (Gallagher et al. 2006: 148).
The upshot of these reflections is clearly that institutional reform along federal
lines produces quite different results in terms of democracy, legitimacy and sovereignty.
If accountability is the problem, then clearly, a lot is to be gained from the reforms
sketched above. Increased accountability should also enhance the democratic legitimacy
of the European institutions and their legislative output. However, this assessment is
already based on an understanding of democracy as rooted in the tradition of popular
sovereignty. Some will continue to argue that democracy and popular sovereignty can
only be institutionalized at the level of the nation state. If this claim is valid, then the
values of accountability and democratic legitimacy and sovereignty would need to be
played off against one another. Our argument is that such state-based accounts of
democracy and popular sovereignty no longer capture the complex empirical reality
of European integration. Increased mechanisms of accountability at the supranational
level generate increased democratic legitimacy and contribute to a reconstitution of
sovereignty at the European level.
4. What’s in it for small states?
The prospect of a federal reorganization of the European Union is of particular
salience from the perspective of the union’s smaller states, based on the fundamental
assertion that federal systems usually display a significant overrepresentation of the
smaller and smallest of their respective constituent units. This overrepresentation in
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the EU, both in the European Parliament and in the Council of Ministers (Bache et al.
2011). The following section elaborates on these points not only in order to demonstrate
how federal structures – and indeed international organizations – are beneficial to
smaller states, even to the extent that some observers find the principle to be “in
open contrast to political equality” (Neyer 2012: 526)1. The more relevant point arises
from the union’s consensus culture despite the fact that qualified majority voting (QMV)
in the Council of Ministers is by now part of the ordinary legislative procedure and thus
the norm in EU legislative decision making. Most important to note in the context is
however  Thorhallsson’s  criticism  of  traditional  understandings  of  state  size  in
international politics in general as well as in the EU in particular (Thorhallsson 2006;
Thorhallson & Wivel 2006).
The traditional dilemma of small states lies in the contradiction between the desire
to retain autonomy and the desire to exert influence (Goetchel 2002: 17). Federalism
opens  a  path  to  reconciling  these  contradictory  claims.  As  we  have  seen,  federal
arrangements allow small states to  retain  their  identity while securing  stability by
sharing authority with a larger entity in areas where it is practical. In a federation,
small  states  can  preserve  their  national  autonomy  while  being  able  to  count  on
infrastructural and political resources and opportunities for influence that they would
otherwise be short of (Goetchel 2002: 18). The threat of extinction is considerably
lessened by tying the existence of the state to a common federal constitution, which
no single level of government is able to change on its own. In the face of globalization
and  continually  growing  international  interdependence,  federal  arrangements  thus
offer small states cooperative ways to maximize their influence in the international
arena. The practical reality of federations is that smaller units usually either have equal
representation in the respective chambers of states or are at least significantly over  -
represented (Stepan 2004b: 55).2
Due to the principle of digressive proportionality (art. 14, Lisbon Treaty), the smallest
states in the EP are already heavily overrepresented in relation to their population
(Bache et al. 2011: 293).3 Larger EU member states have criticized these disparities and
are said to continually try to augment their own powers at the expense of the smaller
states (Þórhallsson 2007: 643), not least because “Eastern” enlargement has profoundly
increased the number of smaller states in the EU, creating a stronger counterbalance
versus the larger ones (Antola 2002: 70). Yet while this over  representation of smaller
states might appear to constitute a violation of the principle of equality (Neyer 2012,
see above), the principle of digressive proportionality has also been argued to be the
politically most sustainable option available at this time (Dinan 2010a: 102f.; cf. Antola
2002: 71). In a federal arrangement, this principle would nonetheless be able to claim
higher democratic legitimacy than at present. (Dinan 2010a:, 241).
The strongly institutionalized consensus culture in the Council of Ministers further
indicates that small states in the European Union are by no means powerless in the
face of larger ones, although – as noted above – qualified majority voting (QMV) is
by now the norm in legislative decision making in the Council. Concerns voiced in the
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abolition of the “national veto” would undermine the role of small states in the
institutions of the EU have turned out to be no more than a theoretical possibility.
State size itself is hardly a relevant cleavage in voting patterns in the Council of
Ministers. More importantly, however, there is still a strong tradition of consensus-
based politics in the EU. 
The role that small states play in the EU institutions further needs to be differenti  -
ated by reference to Thorhallsson’s criticism of traditional definitions of state size
(Thorhallsson 2006). While there is more to the image of a state’s influence in the EU
than size, the notion of size may nonetheless shape the behavior and influence of
nation states as well as their identity and action capacity (Thorhallsson 2006). The
behavior  and  capacity  of  states  in  the  international  arena  is  often  deduced  from
traditional indicators of state size, e.g. territory, economic size and military capacity
(ibid., 27). From a social constructivist perspective, one might however object that
these indicators do not explain the considerable success of small states in influencing
the agenda in the EU, as for instance the literature on the Council Presidency suggests
(Elgström 2002; Bengtsson 2004; more recently Kaniok 2012). Objective factors such
as domestic politics and economics, administrative capability and scope, ambition as
well as strategic stances can influence the perception of state size today (Thorhallsson
2006: 7-10).
To overcome this gap, Thorhallsson introduced “perceptual size” and “preference
size”  as  new  indicators  of  state  size,  which  are  particularly  relevant  in  strongly
institutionalized normative environments such as the European Union. Perceptual size
refers to the perception held by the state itself and by other actors about its potential
for influence (Thorhallsson 2006: 24), whereas preference size refers to a given state’s
ambitions, priorities and ideas about the international system, i.e. its level of ambition
as regards international activities (ibid.: 26). Scandinavian countries count as small
states on the basis of traditional indicators, yet have a self-perception as well as a
proven track record of “active foreign policy”, as in the Swedish case (Elgström 1982).
By the same token, Luxembourg is by all means a small state in terms of traditional
indicators, yet few would dispute that the country is a key actor in European integration.
Institutional  opportunities  such  as  e.g.  the  Council  Presidency  therefore  provide
significant tools for small states to shape EU decision making (Broman 2008), which in
turn has a profound impact on their self-perception as international actors.
To sum up these arguments, state size as defined by traditional indicators is at best
only part of the picture in the EU. This is due in part to the principle of digressive
proportionality and in part to the still strongly institutionalized consensus culture in
EU  decision  making.  These  aspects  can  be  observed  already  today  and  are  well
documented in the literature, even though the EU as a polity sui generis can at best be
defined as a political system with certain federal features. A fuller federal reorganization
would therefore only reinforce these elements in the institutional architecture of the
EU, all the more so if the EU were to develop into a bicameral system of governance
in which the Council of Ministers would play the role of a chamber of states. 
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This article was written out of a concern for the future of democracy in the European
Union. While European integration is considered to be increasingly controversial not
least in the wake of the Eurozone debt crisis, the process is certainly highly likely to
continue well into the future, although some observers hold that “the jury is still out”
regarding this question (Fossum & Menéndez 2012: 57). Assuming that we can treat
European integration as a fact, the question that begs an answer is not only what kind
of democracy is possible and indeed necessary in the polity sui generis as which we
have come to understand the EU. In addition, the question also arises what kind of
democratic theory is necessary to answer questions about the democratic character of
decision making in arenas outside the nation state. As we have seen, European inte  -
gration fundamentally challenges the categories of state-based democratic theory, in
particular  the  notion  of  popular  sovereignty  when  applied  to  supranational  and,
potentially, postnational settings. In this article, we have in many ways played devil’s
advocate, making the case for a reconsideration of federalist theory as a blueprint for
institutional reform in the ongoing process of democratization in the EU. Our most
fundamental point is that federalism is by no means automatically to be associated with
the communitarian understanding of a European federation integrated and sustained
by a cultural community of values. Neither is it to be associated automatically with the
kind of highly centralized (super-)state structure that many Euroskeptics appear to
have in mind when addressing what has increasingly come to be perceived as the F-
word in European integration. Instead, our main contention is that classical federalism,
with  its  emphasis  on  decentralized  democracy  and  unity  in  diversity,  is  perfectly
compatible  with  the  cosmopolitan  understanding  of  democracy  in  a  rights-based,
postnational European Union, founded on principles of constitutional patriotism. It is
therefore unsurprising that Habermas, whose writings have after all inspired the whole
literature on the EU as a postnational union, emphasizes the need for EU constitution
making, despite the reservation that this kind of Eurofederalism may be little more
than a mere reproduction of the same kind of democracy at a higher level.
Our treatment of federalism staked out a fairly straight-forward path to democratic
institutional  reform  in  the  EU.  With  an  emphasis  on  democratic  legitimacy  and
accountability, we demonstrated that a strengthening of the supranational institutions
could – and indeed would have to – go hand in hand with creating a form of direct
accountability mechanisms that does not exist in the EU as of today. We further
argued that this lack of accountability – as part and parcel of the democratic deficit –
is no coincidence, stemming as it does from the intergovernmental legacy of the
integration process. Although it is usually intergovernmentalist skeptics of further
integration who bemoan the democratic deficit, they are the same who also resist any
moves in the direction of further supranationlization. We further emphasized the
particular relevance of federalism for small states. Due to the already existing federal
features  of  the  EU’s  institutional  architecture,  we  can  observe  a  fairly  obvious
overrepresentation of small states in the EU’s major institutions. Were the EU to go
even further down the federal path, these elements would be likely to become even
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proportionality in the European Parliament and the consensus culture in the Council
of Ministers are testimony to the role and power potential of small states.
One thorny issue remains nonetheless. The possible routes for institutional reform
we  have  presented  and  assessed  here  will  matter  little  in  terms  of  the  ongoing
democratization of the EU if there continues to be fundamental disagreement about
the basic meaning of democratic rule. For those who subscribe to the notion that
democracy, as rule of the people, is bound to the context of democratically constituted
national communities, any move in the supranational direction will be normatively
inappropriate, as will be a profound reconstitution of democracy at the European
level. From this perspective, the very notion of European demos construction is a
fundamental blow to the notion of national sovereignty. But then again, even from
this perspective, it is virtually impossible to get around the fundamental observation
that more and more decisions in the globalized world are taken in forums beyond the
nation state. It is hardly news that these processes not only undermine the sovereignty
of the nation state, but also its legitimacy. Against this backdrop, the need for a
reconstitution of democracy presents itself with profound urgency. Again, European
integration – whether as a response to economic globalization or otherwise – is a fact;
whether, to what extent and in what ways the process should be created democratically
is up to the Europeans themselves.
Notes
1 Jürgen Neyer acknowledges that this is a standard feature of federal systems, but maintains that
the EU for one is not a federal polity, and that by comparison to federal polities, the principle of
digressive proportionality applies to both legislative chambers.
2 In Germany’s Bundesrat, even the largest state (North Rhine – Westphalia) has only six votes,
while the smallest state (Bremen) has three – although the former state has around 27 times the
number of inhabitants than the former. In the U.S. Senate, the rule is one state, two representatives,
and the difference in population between the smallest and the largest state there is even greater
than in Germany (Stepan 2004b: 55).
3 One Maltese MEP represents only about 66.000 inhabitants, while one German MEP represents
as many as about 860.000 residents (Dinan 2010a: 239).
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